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DEMOCRACIES
Alexander Benard

I.

*

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) is the
sole international body explicitly empowered to authorize the
use of force. The United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter) gives
the U.N.S.C. the responsibility to “determine the existence of
any threat to the peace” and to “decide what measures shall be
taken” to address that threat. 1 These measures range from the
severance of diplomatic relations to military action, which, for
purposes of this Article, will be collectively referred to as
“punitive measures.” Alongside the option of presenting a
compelling argument that its use of force constitutes selfdefense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a U.N.S.C.
resolution presently is the only way for a country to render its
use of force lawful under international law. 2
It is undoubtedly valuable to have an international
institution that serves this function. From the U.S. point of
view, authorization of the use of force by the U.N.S.C. has
given the United States much-needed credibility for its
expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, its punitive measures
against Serbia during the Bosnia conflict, and its protection of
*
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civilian populations in Somalia, among others. This credibility,
in turn, has often helped American presidents gain support for
the use of force domestically as well as from allies abroad.
From the international point of view, meanwhile, the U.N.S.C.
provides what is viewed by many as a check on the arbitrary use
of force that for centuries placed weaker states entirely at the
mercy of stronger ones.
The current system, however, suffers from a number of
important deficiencies. The conflicting priorities of the
U.N.S.C.’s membership frequently result in gridlock, even in
situations when action by the U.N.S.C. would clearly advance
the interests of international peace and security—to oppose
genocide, for example, or to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. The U.N.S.C. also suffers from a
democracy deficit in two respects. First, the U.N.S.C. gives
more power to some members than to others, affording certain
members the power to veto U.N.S.C. resolutions. 3 Second,
some of the members of the U.N.S.C. themselves do not have
democratic political systems, raising questions about the extent
to which their governments can credibly speak on behalf of their
peoples in voting for or against punitive measures in a particular
situation.
These shortcomings compel us to reevaluate the present
international security architecture and to consider alternative
institutions that might better address the threats and challenges
of the 21st century. This Article posits that the most appealing
alternative institution is a Concert of Democracies, an
organization that would consist only of countries that are
democracies, as determined by objective criteria. 4 This
organization would be better positioned to determine when to
authorize the use of force, because its members would agree on
certain core values—the importance of protecting human rights,
eliminating terrorism, and preventing the spread of weapons of
mass destruction—and they would speak with the moral weight
that results from being a country’s popularly elected
representative. A Concert of Democracies, then, would be a
more appropriate venue through which to take collective action
in response to modern threats.
Part II of this Article provides background information
about the U.N.S.C.’s role within the current international
3

U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
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States.
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security architecture and describes the failure of the U.N.S.C. to
respond to threats to international peace and security. This Part
also sets forth the proposals for reform of the U.N.S.C. and
discusses why these reforms do not address the underlying flaws
of the existing system. Part III describes how a Concert of
Democracies would operate and explains the advantages of a
Concert of Democracies vis-à-vis the U.N.S.C. Finally, Part IV
offers ideas for how to attract support for a system in which a
Concert of Democracies, rather than the U.N.S.C., authorizes
the use of force. Part IV also discusses how to establish a
Concert of Democracies without violating existing international
law.
II.

THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE

The United Nations was founded in 1946, in the shadow
of World War II.5 At the end of that war, the United States and
the Soviet Union were the two preeminent powers. France and
Great Britain, though less powerful than the United States or the
Soviet Union, ultimately found themselves on the winning side
of the war, and subsequently—together with the United States
and the Soviet Union—set about determining the structure of
the post-war international framework, including the United
Nations, the nascent institution around which that framework
would coalesce. The losing powers, on the other hand, most
notably Germany and Japan, had virtually no say in how to
structure the United Nations. 6
As a result, the U.N.S.C. reflects the power dynamics
that existed at that time. At the outset, the United States, the
Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and China were given
permanent seats on the U.N.S.C., the United Nations’ most
important and powerful organ—the only branch of the United
Nations capable of compelling a country to take, or refrain from
taking, a particular action. 7 What is more, these permanent
members of the U.N.S.C. were also given veto power over
substantive decisions of the U.N.S.C., a matter of particular
importance to the Soviet Union, which insisted on the veto
power and advocated for the scope of that power to be as
expansive as possible. 8 In accordance with Article 27,
decisions of the U.N.S.C. on any matters other than those that
5
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are purely procedural “shall be made by an affirmative vote of
nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members.” 9 Any one of the victors of World War II was
thereby empowered to simply block a substantive decision by
the U.N.S.C., such as the authorization of the use of force, if it
so chose.
A. Cold War Gridlock
During the Cold War, this configuration resulted in nearconstant gridlock. 10 At a theoretical level, it is not difficult to
see why this would be the case: with the United States and the
Soviet Union increasingly taking a hostile position towards one
another, the use of force by one of the two would inevitably be
viewed with suspicion and skepticism by the other—and would
be met with resistance in the U.N.S.C. The record bore out this
dynamic. As one scholar put it, “unless one side was napping,
like the Russians at the start of the Korean War, the [U.N.S.C.]
could do very little” during the Cold War. 11
B. Post-Cold War
When the Cold War ended, there was widespread
optimism that the U.N.S.C. could finally become a more
effective body. No longer locked in a zero-sum struggle, many
believed the United States and Russia would agree upon what
constituted threats to international peace and security, and the
powers would cooperate in formulating responses to those
threats. As one scholar argued following the end of the Cold
War, “the interests of the major powers in seeking to counter the
new security threats are essentially in alignment.” 12 In light of
the fact that modern threats no longer involve direct clashes
between the major powers, “the international security
architecture is actually better suited to addressing these threats
than it was to countering the conventional state-versus-state
conflicts for which it was created.” 13 These optimists
envisioned a post-Cold War world in which the U.N.S.C. could
at long last effectively serve its original purpose.
Unfortunately, that optimism has not been met with
concrete improvements in the U.N.S.C.’s ability to tackle
threats to international peace and security. The U.N.S.C. failed
9
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to authorize the use of force in response to the ethnic cleansing
of Muslim populations in Kosovo, ultimately requiring the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to take action
without explicit U.N.S.C. approval. 14 More recently, the
U.N.S.C. has dithered on the issue of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in Iran and North Korea, in both cases preventing the
imposition of tough sanctions despite concerted efforts by the
United States and its allies to do just that. 15 Finally, the
U.N.S.C. has been largely silent on the ongoing genocide in
Sudan due to the strong opposition from China and Russia to
punitive measures directed against the Sudanese government. 16
1. Conflicting Interests
The principal reason that the U.N.S.C. has not become
more effective since the end of the Cold War is that the interests
of the U.N.S.C. members have not, in fact, aligned to the extent
that some had expected. To be sure, there is no doubt that
China and Russia care about issues like terrorism and the spread
of weapons of mass destruction, but they have other concerns
that are of even greater importance to them. For example,
China and Russia continue to view the world through the prism
of “spheres of influence,” and jealously guard areas within their
sphere from perceived foreign encroachment. This concern
recently motivated China and Russia to advocate for the
expulsion of U.S. troops from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
despite the fact that access to bases in both these countries has
been critical to America’s and NATO’s efforts against al Qaeda
in Afghanistan—efforts which manifestly benefit the entire
international community. 17 But China and Russia’s desire to
keep the U.S. and NATO outside their sphere of influence
trumped their interest in combating the threat of terrorism in
Afghanistan.
14

See Javier Solana, NATO’s Success in Kosovo, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.Dec. 1999.
15
Alexander Benard & Paul Leaf, Note, Modern Threats and the
United Nations Security Council: No Time for Complacency, 62 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010).
16
Id.
17
See Council on Foreign Relations, Russia’s Wrong Direction: What
the United States Can and Should Do, Independent Task Force Report No.
57 (2005), available at
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia_TaskForce.pdf.
See also Richard Weitz, U.S. Military Strives to Maintain Presence in
Central Asia, CENT. ASIA-CAUCASUS INST., July 2007, available at
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4665; Council on Foreign Relations,
Asia: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia (2005), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8440/#3.
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China and Russia also have applied the logic of balance
of power, often shielding governments like Iran, North Korea,
and the Sudan from U.N.S.C. resolutions. 18 China and Russia
do this because rogue nations such as North Korea remain a
thorn in the side of the United States and its allies by preventing
the spread of U.S. influence in important regions like the
Middle East and Africa. On top of this, China and Russia have
become economically intertwined with many of these rogue
regimes—China is investing roughly $100 billion to develop oil
and gas fields in Iran, and has also invested substantial amounts
of money in the Sudanese oil industry—making them reluctant
to authorize sanctions or other measures that could damage their
economic interests. 19 These considerations have tended to
preclude China, Russia, and other like-minded countries from
joining the United States and its allies in tackling issues such as
genocide, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
2. Conflicting Values
More fundamentally, however, there is an irreconcilable
tension between the purported goals of the U.N. Charter, on the
one hand, and the U.N.S.C.’s structure and membership, on the
other. The Preamble to the U.N. Charter states that the
organization is determined, among other things, to “reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights” and in the “equal rights of
men and women.” 20 It also articulates a determination to
promote “social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom.” 21 Elsewhere, in Article 1, the U.N. Charter goes on
to state among its purposes the promotion and encouragement of
“respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 22
These goals are noble and appropriate, but it is difficult
to see how the United Nations can effectively advance these
goals when non-democratic countries wield a veto power in the
U.N.S.C., and when other non-democratic countries regularly
18

Benard & Leaf, supra note 15.
See Peter S. Goodman, China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil
Industry, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2004, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html.
See also Peter S. Goodman, China Rushes to Complete $100B Deal with
Iran, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021701117.html.
20
U.N. Charter pmbl.
21
Id.
22
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
19

6

hold rotating seats on the U.N.S.C. China and Russia have little
incentive to authorize punitive measures in response to
genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other gross violations of human
rights when China and Russia themselves are often guilty of
engaging in human rights violations. Indeed, China and Russia
recognize that the very logic underlying the punitive measures
in these situations might one day justify action in response to
their own human rights abuses. Two scholars recently
summarized the point:
. . . Russia and especially China have become
the foremost defenders of the principle that
states are the exclusive masters of their own
internal affairs. They have resisted—from
Kosovo to Darfur to Burma—every action
proposed by the United States and the European
Union that would interfere in the domestic
circumstances of other states. 23
The same applies to rotating members like Libya, Burkina Faso,
and Uganda, all three of which currently hold seats on the
U.N.S.C. The composition of the U.N.S.C.’s membership,
therefore, presents a direct and inherent impediment to
advancing human rights and promoting international peace and
security.
This issue is certain to remain a source of tension in the
years ahead. Democracies will continue to seek authorization
from the U.N.S.C. to take action in defense of the values
enshrined in the U.N. Charter—values which democratic
countries deem universal. Non-democracies, meanwhile, will
continue their pattern of intransigence and obstruction. Former
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan summarized the
dilemma as a question of whether, in these situations,
democracies should act without U.N.S.C. authorization and
thereby violate international law, or whether they should respect
international law and sit idly by as atrocities occur on their
watch. 24 The more often democracies are forced to make this
choice, the more frustrated they will grow with the present
international security architecture.
23

Ivo Daalder & James Lindsay, Democracies of the World, Unite,
AM. INT., Jan.-Feb. 2007, available at http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article.cfm?piece=220.
24
Kofi Annan, Intervention by the UN Security Council in the Internal
Affairs of States, UN CHRON., Fall 1998, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_3_35/ai_54259305/?tag=conte
nt;col1.
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C. Proposals to Reform the Existing System
Many have argued that reforming the existing policies
and structure of the United Nations could address these
deficiencies. Reforming the United Nations is appealing
because, among other reasons, it would avoid the controversy
and conflict that would inevitably accompany an overhaul of the
entire international security architecture. 25 The reforms which
have attracted the most attention are (1) adjusting the
U.N.S.C.’s membership, (2) stripping veto power in certain
situations, (3) imposing a “responsibility to protect”, (4)
revising the text of Article 51, and (5) establishing a Democracy
Caucus at the United Nations.
1. Security Council Reform
For over a decade, there have been continuous calls to
reform the membership structure of the U.N.S.C. 26 The most
frequently mentioned reform proposal is to expand the
permanent membership of the U.N.S.C. to make the U.N.S.C.
reflect the global distribution of power that exists today, rather
than the distribution of power that existed in 1945. Indeed, as
far back as 1998, one scholar noted the following:
Most governments, interested non-governmental
organizations and academic observers agree that
in the last decades the international state system
and, more generally, conditions of international
relations have experienced a change so profound
that the status quo established in 1945 cannot be
maintained without running the risk of
relegating the [United Nations] to the backseats
of international life. 27

25

In evaluating the various proposals for reforming the United
Nations, however, it is important to keep in mind that any amendment to the
U.N. Charter requires the following:
(1) A vote of two third of the members of the General Assembly;
(2) Ratification in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes by two thirds of the members of the United Nations; and
(3) Ratification by all the permanent members of the U.N.S.C.
U.N. Charter art. 108.
26
See, e.g., BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
AND THE RIGHT OF VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998).
27
Id. at 6.
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That consensus has only strengthened in recent years,
and today there is little doubt that the U.N.S.C. does in fact need
to expand its membership to avoid alienating increasingly
important members of the international community. The
discussion now centers more on the question of which countries
should be admitted to the U.N.S.C. Most agree that Brazil,
Germany, India, and Japan are the top contenders for a non-veto
holding permanent seat on the U.N.S.C. 28 Other scholars have
also suggested adding one or two African countries to ensure
that the continent’s views are represented in important U.N.S.C.
deliberations. 29
While U.N.S.C. expansion addresses the problem of
preserving the U.N.S.C.’s legitimacy, it does not deal with the
U.N.S.C.’s present inability to tackle important threats to
international peace and security. 30 Since the end of the Cold
War, China and Russia have used their veto power to prevent
the U.N.S.C. from taking meaningful action in response to gross
human rights violations, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and other modern threats. 31 Giving Brazil or
Germany a permanent seat on the U.N.S.C. is necessary to
prevent the U.N.S.C. from becoming irrelevant, but it will not
help the U.N.S.C. grapple more effectively with modern threats,
because it leaves untouched China and Russia’s power to veto
any action with which they disagree.

28

See, e.g., Japan, India, Germany, Brazil Push for UN Security
Council Enlargement, VOICE AM., Jul. 7, 2005,available at
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-07/2005-07-07voa1.cfm?moddate=2005-07-07 [hereinafter UN Security Council
Enlargement].
29
G. John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a World of
Liberty Under Law, PRINCETON PROJECT ON NATL. SEC. (2006).
30
Some scholars have argued that expansion of the U.N.S.C. is also
unrealistic. See, e.g., JOHN BOLTON, SURRENDER IS NOT AN OPTION 251
(2007):
Unfortunately for Japan, China has no particular enthusiasm, to say
the least, for Japan’s candidacy. India has a claim of sorts, given its
population size and rising economic importance, but it is bitterly opposed by
Pakistan, which does not want its rival since birth to gain an upper hand in so
important a body. Brazil wants a permanent seat, as the largest country in
the Western Hemisphere after the United States, a yearning not shared by its
Spanish-speaking fellow Latins such as Mexico or Argentina, which have
their own ideas about who should represent Latin America. Id.
31

See, e.g., Robert Kagan, End of Dreams, Return of History, POL’Y
REV., Aug.-Sept. 2007.
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2. Veto Power Reform
At various points in time, different groups have argued
in favor of abolishing the veto power on the grounds that it is at
odds with one of the foundational principles of the United
Nations, namely, the “equal rights . . . of nations large and
small.” 32 At a meeting of developing countries that took place
in 1992, for example, a group representing two-thirds of the
United Nations’ membership released a statement calling for an
end to the veto power and arguing that the “exclusive and
dominant” role it affords the permanent members of the
U.N.S.C. is “contrary to the aim of democratizing the United
Nations.” 33
The goal of eliminating altogether the veto power of the
permanent members of the U.N.S.C. has been largely
abandoned, given that it would be impossible to obtain the
necessary support of the existing veto-holders. 34 But a new
version of this initiative has now been conceived. Under this
new version, the veto power would be eliminated only in certain
limited contexts, for example if a country is proposing to take
direct action in response to an acute threat. 35 Anne-Marie
Slaughter and John Ikenberry are the most prominent scholars to
give voice to this idea, arguing the following in a recent report:
The veto should be abolished for U.N.S.C.
resolutions authorizing direct action in response
to a crisis. It makes no sense, in 2006, for five
countries that represent the distribution of power
at the end of World War II to have individual
vetoes over what constitutes legitimate action.
The current veto process does not serve the
interests of the United States. America does not
need to block action of which we do not
approve; we are almost always pushing the
U.N.S.C. to take action rather than not, and in
32

U.N. Charter pmbl.
UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECURITY COUNCIL, TENTH
CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF NON-ALIGNED
COUNTRIES, Sept. 1-6, 1992, Jakarta, THE JAKARTA MESSAGE: A CALL FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, U.N. Doc. A/47/675 (1992).
34
See Louis Charbonneau, Nations Line Up to Slam Big Powers’ UN
Veto Rights, PORTFOLIO, Mar. 17, 2009 (reporting that Germany’s permanent
representative to the United Nations said the veto power was “an
anachronism and should be abolished,” but acknowledged that hopes of
eliminating the veto power were “unrealistic”).
35
Ikenberry, supra note 29, at 24.
33
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those cases where we are unpersuaded of the
wisdom of a particular course, we prefer to use
diplomacy rather than the veto. Instead, the
veto is a license for prevarication,
obstructionism, and disillusionment. The veto
should be replaced by a supermajority vote—of
perhaps three-quarters of voting members—in
an enlarged Security Council. 36
This proposal has the potential to enhance the
effectiveness of the U.N.S.C. It would streamline decisionmaking within the U.N.S.C., by making it more difficult for a
single country to stymie collective action. Unfortunately,
however, the proposal remains impracticable—much like the
original idea of abolishing the veto altogether. Stripping the
power to veto resolutions that authorize responses to acute
threats would significantly dilute the power of the five current
veto-wielding members of the U.N.S.C. It is thus extremely
unlikely that this reform proposal would garner the necessary
support of the permanent members of the U.N.S.C., including
the United States.
3. Responsibility to Protect
In a recent report commissioned by the Secretary
General of the United Nations, a panel of experts recommended
that all U.N. members accept the “responsibility to protect.” 37
The responsibility to protect has two main pillars: First, it
requires that states do everything in their power to protect their
citizens from “avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape,
ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate
starvation and exposure to disease.” 38 Second, it recognizes
that when states are unwilling or unable to fulfill this
requirement, the international community has an obligation to
act in protection of those citizens—even if this means setting
aside some traditional concerns surrounding national
sovereignty. 39
But it is unclear how the responsibility to protect would
work in practice. As previously discussed, the U.N. Charter
allows punitive measures or the use of force only in self-defense
36

Id. at 25.
See generally GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL (2008).
38
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, G.A. Res.
59/565, at 201, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
39
Id.
37
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or with explicit authorization from the U.N.S.C. In order to
have a significant impact, then, the U.N. Charter would have to
be amended to provide for the responsibility to protect as a third
and separate scenario. Few scholars, however, are proposing
the responsibility to protect as an explicit amendment to the
U.N. Charter, and in any event such an amendment would have
very little chance of being approved. Rather, scholars generally
suggest that states individually accept the responsibility to
protect as a separate obligation. The hope, presumably, is that
once countries have accepted the responsibility to protect, they
will feel obligated in the U.N.S.C. to vote in favor of action to
enforce that responsibility.
Such a conception of how the responsibility to protect
would work is problematic in two respects. First, for the very
reason that China and Russia oppose these types of enforcement
actions in the first place, both nations are extremely unlikely to
accept the responsibility to protect – especially because they
have signaled their opposition in the past. China, for example,
knows that human rights groups will use the logic of the
responsibility to protect to chastise the Chinese regime for its
treatment of Tibetans and other minorities in China. Equally
important is the fact that China and Russia know that the
responsibility to protect would require them to vote in the
U.N.S.C. against the interests of many of their allies and trading
partners.
Second, even if China and Russia do accept the
responsibility to protect, it would be unreasonable to expect
them to change their U.N.S.C. voting patterns accordingly. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights already impose non-binding
obligations on states in the areas of human, civil, and political
rights. 40 These non-binding obligations, however, have had
little impact on state behavior, and appear to have had no impact
whatsoever on the behavior and voting patterns of China and
Russia. 41 Hence, there is no evidence that a responsibility to
protect would result in any tangible improvements in the
decision-making of the U.N.S.C.
4. Article 51 Reform

40

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
41
Benard & Leaf, supra note 15.
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At present, Article 51 imposes strict limits on a
country’s right to resort to self-defense. Article 51 affirms a
country’s “inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense” in situations when an armed attack “occurs” against a
member of the United Nations. 42 A literal reading of this
provision would allow the exercise of self-defense only in
circumstances where an armed attack has already occurred.
Most, however, believe that Article 51 allows a state to take
action in response to an imminent threat, so long as the action in
response to that threat is both necessary (i.e., the underlying
threat is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means and no moment of deliberation”) and proportional (i.e.,
the response is “not unreasonable” and kept clearly within the
bounds of the original necessity that justified the use of force). 43
Even under this more expansive interpretation, then, Article 51
imposes clear constraints.
Several scholars have argued that the scope of Article 51
should be broadened. These scholars point out that Article 51
presently would not allow a country to take preventive action
against, for example, a rogue regime that is in the process of
developing weapons of mass destruction. John Yoo has been
one of the most vocal proponents of reforming Article 51,
arguing that innovations in technology have allowed for attacks
that are “more devastating and occur with less warning,”
presenting a potentially decisive advantage to the side that
strikes first. 44 Yoo thus believes that the current law on selfdefense leaves nations “ill-equipped” to handle modern threats,
and proposes that Article 51 also take into account two
additional factors: first, the magnitude of the harm of a possible
attack; and second, the probability that the attack will occur. 45
This approach would provide states with “greater flexibility to
use force as the likelihood of an attack increases” and would, in
the words of Yoo, move the law away from a rule and “closer to
a standard.” 46
Yoo’s remedy, however, would not address the problem
of humanitarian interventions. At present, one of the chief
42

U.N. Charter art. 51.
Daniel Webster, Letter to Henry Fox, British Minister in
Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), in 1 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS: REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL
PRINT pt. I, ser. C, at 153, 159 (Kenneth Bourne & D. Cameron Watt eds.,
1986).
44
John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 742 (2004).
45
Id. at 751.
46
Id. at 760.
43
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problems with the U.N.S.C. is the reluctance of some vetowielding members to authorize interventions in response to
humanitarian catastrophes such as human rights abuses,
genocide, or ethnic cleansing. Russia, for example, made clear
that it would veto the proposed use of force against Serbia in
response to that country’s campaign against the Muslim
populations in Kosovo. 47 The intervention in that case by the
United States and several European countries, however, could
not have been justified under Article 51, even under the more
expansive definition of self-defense. Article 51 reform thus
leaves open the question of how to deal with this large and
important category of interventions that most consider to be in
the interests of international peace and security but that often
cannot secure the U.N.S.C. approval required to render the
intervention lawful.
Furthermore, some have argued that expanding the
definition of self-defense as proposed by Yoo would allow
countries to become, for all intents and purposes, their own
arbiters on the question of the legitimacy of the use of force. 48
Yoo admits that under his framework, Article 51 would become
more of a standard than a rule. 49 In domestic law, standards
pose no inherent threat to the rule of law because an impartial
third party, a court, is charged with administering that
standard—however loose. In international law, by contrast,
there is no impartial third party. 50 If rules are converted to
standards in the international context—where nation-states are
themselves tasked with applying the rules and standards to their
conduct—the impact could be to lessen the constraints placed
on individual states and render those areas of international law
virtually meaningless.
5. Democracy Caucus at the United Nations
Finally, another emergent idea is for the United States to
take a more active role in coordinating its efforts with the other
democratic members of the United Nations by spearheading a
“Democracy Caucus.” 51 This idea developed in response to a
47
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successful movement among developing countries to increase
their overall power by forming a bloc that acts in concert on
critical votes that come before the United Nations General
Assembly. In forming this bloc, referred to as the “Group of
77,” developing countries have had tremendous success in
advancing their interests. 52 Democracies, perhaps, could do the
same if they, too, banded together and voted as a bloc on certain
critical issues.
Two fatal flaws prevent this proposal from having a
significant impact. First, democratic countries do not presently
have the numbers necessary to form a sufficiently powerful
voting bloc. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit,
which every year tracks the number of democracies in the
world, only 30 countries are presently “full democracies.” 53
Another 50 countries are considered “flawed democracies.” 54 A
large proportion of those flawed democracies are developing
countries which are also members of the Group of 77. At best,
their commitment to the Democracy Caucus will be
unreliable—sometimes they will caucus with the democracies,
but sometimes they will remain in the developing world’s camp.
This manner of intermittent commitment by many members
would make it impossible for the Democracy Caucus to wield
substantial influence.
Second, and far more important, a Democracy Caucus
could never affect the truly important decisions of the United
Nations—the decisions of war and peace—since those decisions
are made by the U.N.S.C. Even if the Democracy Caucus were
able to attract large numbers and enforce strict loyalty among its
members, the veto-wielding autocracies in the U.N.S.C. could
still block any meaningful action. A Democracy Caucus within
the United Nations, therefore, would fail to address the central
flaw of the present system for authorizing the use of force.

11, 2006, at 2, http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06912-hrd-undcsignatures.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2009), for letters signed by over forty
human rights and democracy leaders urging the establishment of an effective
democracy caucus.
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visited Nov. 14, 2009).
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F/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2009).
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III.

CONCERT OF DEMOCRACIES

The United States, under the leadership of the Truman
administration, was instrumental in shaping the institutions—the
United Nations, NATO, and others—that together formed the
international security architecture of the 20th century. Now it
might consider taking the lead in crafting a new institution
suited for the demands of the 21st century: a Concert of
Democracies, an organization comprised of the world’s
democratic countries.
A. Role
A Concert of Democracies would provide democratic
countries an alternative venue in which to coordinate activities
and advance their interests. This would allow democratic
countries to better address security challenges like terrorism and
the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes like
Iran and North Korea. It would also help democratic countries
promote civil, political, and human rights—both by solidifying
those rights among existing and aspiring members, and by
applying more focused pressure than the U.N.S.C. on nondemocracies that violate those rights.
Although the Concert of Democracies could
theoretically replace the United Nations altogether, most
advocate beginning with an organization that, at least
nominally, is situated within the United Nations framework. 55
Nonetheless, for the Concert of Democracies to be effective, it
will need to have the power to authorize punitive measures.
Otherwise, democracies will continue to require a U.N.S.C.
resolution to use force, and will thus remain at the mercy of
Chinese and Russian vetoes—the Concert of Democracies, then,
will have accomplished nothing. 56
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See, e.g., Daalder, supra note 16 (noting that “[t]he Concert of
Democracies is not a substitute for all other forms of multilateral and
bilateral cooperation, but a complement to them.”); Tod Lindberg, The
Treaty of the Democratic Peace, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 12, 2007 (arguing
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U.N. Charter.”); and Ikenberry, supra note 29, at 25 (arguing that the
Concert of Democracies should function “ideally within existing regional
and global institutions . . . ”).
56
Two scholars have proposed that the Concert of Democracies
should be allowed to authorize the use of force “to enforce the purposes of

16

B. Structure
Under one structure, which would resemble the United
Nations, the Concert of Democracies would consist of two main
organs—a larger one, comprising the organization’s full
membership, and a smaller one that would only contain a select
portion. For purposes of efficient decision-making, the smaller
organ would have responsibility over urgent matters that require
swift, decisive responses. Seats in the smaller organ of the
Concert of Democracies would be allotted on a rotating
schedule and based on regional representation. Each region of
the world would be allotted a certain number of seats. Members
from that region would rotate the seats in the smaller organ at
one-year or two-year intervals and would be tasked, of course,
with taking into consideration not merely their own interests,
but the interests of the region they represent. This system
would be very much like the rotation system that governs the
presidency of the European Union. 57
Under a similar proposal, inspired largely by NATO, the
Concert of Democracies would consist of multiple regional
councils, which would form the bedrock of the organization.
The bulk of the organization’s deliberations would occur within
these regional councils, which would also to a large extent
oversee implementation of the Concert of Democracies’
decisions. The regional councils would be connected to each
other via a steering committee, which would coordinate between
and among the regional councils and make strategic decisions
on behalf of the Concert of Democracies. Each regional council
would be represented on the steering committee by an elected
representative of that region.
Both of these proposals have advantages and
disadvantages. Through the smaller organ in the one case and
the Steering Committee in the other, a Concert of Democracies
would be able to make certain decisions efficiently—without
having to consult the entire membership. But this strength is
also a weakness. Members holding rotating seats on the smaller
organ or the Steering Committee may fail to take seriously their
responsibility to represent not just their own views, but those of
their regions as well. This could lead to friction among the
the United Nations in the wake of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression” or in other ways that are “consistent with the purposes
of the United Nations.” Ikenberry supra note 29, at 61.
57
See Fact Sheet on the Presidency of the Council of the European
Union, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/union_presidency_en.htm (last
visited Nov. 15, 2009).
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members in a particular regional group. This also means that
the decisions made by the smaller organ or the Steering
Committee would carry less weight, since they would contain
the input of only a portion of those countries that comprise the
organization.
A third structure would create a Concert of Democracies
that consisted of only one chamber. This would have the
advantage of allowing all members to participate in critical
decisions, which would give the organization’s decisions more
weight. It could, however, result in a degree of chaos, with
matters large and small having to be subjected to debate among
a large number of representatives. To mitigate the chaotic
dimension of this plan, members might form committees
empowered to make recommendations to the full membership.
Members might also adopt rules governing the amount of time
that can be spent on a given issue.
C. Membership and Voting
Under any proposed structure, the nature of the
membership and the Concert of Democracies’ decision-making
procedures would differ significantly from those of the United
Nations. The membership will consist of democratic regimes,
meaning those that (a) uphold majority rule through regularly
scheduled free and fair elections, and (b) protect basic rights
such as freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, the right to
assembly, and property rights. 58 Numerous independent
organizations measure these factors, including Freedom House,
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Countries potentially eligible for membership at present include:
United States of America and Canada (North America); Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Costa
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the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Bank, and others. 59
One could easily envision a composite index that takes all of
these factors into account in determining eligibility for
membership in the Concert of Democracies.
With respect to voting, the drastic change is that a
Concert of Democracies will replace the veto with a majority
vote. To be sure, for some decisions—to authorize the use of
force, for example—the requirement would be for a
supermajority vote of two-thirds or three-quarters, but no
country will have the power to unilaterally prevent the use of
punitive measures, the deployment of peacekeeping troops, or
other actions that are vital to maintaining international peace
and security.
D. Advantages of a Concert of Democracies
1. Greater Legitimacy
Building upon the work of international law theorists
and political philosophers, Thomas Franck has identified two
factors that confer legitimacy on the decisions made by
international institutions. 60 First, the decisions must be made in
accordance with a decision-making process that is widely
accepted. 61 Second, the various actors participating in that
decision-making process must, at a basic level, have respect for
each other, meaning there must be some sense of community
among the various members that make up the organization.62
Put simply, there has to be a general degree of comfort with
how decisions are made, and who is making the decisions.
A Concert of Democracies, much more so than the
U.N.S.C., would meet these criteria of legitimacy. Democracies
universally accept the notion that a popular vote is the most
legitimate process for making a decision—the whole concept of
democratic governance relies on that very premise. This,
incidentally, stands in contradistinction to non-democracies,
which do not accept the premise that a majority vote is the most
legitimate process for making decisions. As a result, there was
59
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always a certain degree of incoherence to the U.N.S.C., where
non-democratic governments participated in the quintessentially
democratic process of making decisions by a popular vote. That
incoherence would no longer exist in a Concert of Democracies.
All members of a Concert of Democracies would be fully
committed, as a matter of principle, to the organization’s
democratic decision-making process, which, in turn, would
result in more deeply-felt respect for the outcomes of that
process.
A Concert of Democracies would also be a more
cohesive community in which the views of other members
would be widely respected. Democracies, on a fundamental
level, are somewhat skeptical of non-democratic regimes
because it is never clear whether those regimes can truly “claim
to be speaking for the people of their countries.” 63 Countless
democratic documents express a clear sense that democratic
government is morally superior to other forms of government
and that democratic governments enjoy greater legitimacy,
having been endowed with certain powers directly by their own
people. 64 Their opinions carry the force of majority sentiment
in their countries, while the decisions of an autocrat may
represent little more than the autocrat’s own personal whim. All
of this means that for purposes of legitimacy, democratic
governments care more about what their fellow democracies—
their jury of peers, as it were—think than what monarchic or
autocratic governments think. An explicit repudiation by a
purely democratic body such as the Concert of Democracies
would, therefore, carry significantly greater weight for
democracies than repudiation by an international organization
consisting of various different types of governments.
Of course, these arguments leave unaddressed the
question of how countries that are not members of the Concert
of Democracies will view the organization’s decisions. As one
vocal critic of the Concert of Democracies has argued, even if
63
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many in the United States and some other parts of the world
believe that a Concert of Democracies could engage in more
legitimate decision-making than the U.N.S.C., many in the rest
of the world do not:
Consider [the Concert of Democracies’]
potential engagement in the Middle East, a
region that would probably have two members
in the global body—Israel and Turkey—but no
Arab representatives. Were the [Concert of
Democracies] to carry out a military
intervention in the region, the Arab world would
see it as the West against the rest—and react
with even more hostility than it did to the 2003
invasion of Iraq. 65
This raises a valid concern, but upon scrutiny the
concern is more theoretical than actual. In practice, members of
a Concert of Democracies would still engage in vigorous
diplomacy to marshal support among non-members for any
punitive measures. To stay with the above example, the views
of Arab governments would be an important part of the Concert
of Democracies’ decision-making process, in spite of their
absence from the organization itself. In that sense, the Concert
of Democracies would slightly differ from the United Nations.
In the United Nations, of course, it is the U.N.S.C., and not the
General Assembly, which makes decisions on the use of force.
The U.N.S.C., which frequently makes decisions that impact the
Arab world, does not have permanent Arab representation—
since no Arab country is a permanent member of the U.N.S.C.
and the system for rotating members does not assign a seat
specifically to the Arab world. Indeed, when the U.N.S.C.
authorized the Gulf War in 1990, the Arab world had no
meaningful representation at the U.N.S.C. and in subsequent
years, when the United States took various different punitive
measures against Iraq, which included sanctions and no-fly
zones, the Arab world had no representation whatsoever at the
U.N.S.C. 66
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Moreover, non-members will likely judge the Concert of
Democracies’ actions on the basis of the perceived rightness or
wrongness of the actions themselves or, put differently, on
whether non-members agree with the Concert of Democracies’
decisions. If there is general agreement, for example, that the
Concert of Democracies is doing the right thing in response to
human rights violations, there will be little outcry simply
because it was the Concert of Democracies, and not some other
international body, that authorized the action. 67 Conversely, if
there is widespread opposition to the substance of the Concert
of Democracies’ actions, then there will be a popular
backlash—just as there would be a backlash today if the
U.N.S.C. approves a controversial action. The difference,
however, is that under the present system a small minority that
opposes a particular set of punitive measures can prevent those
measures altogether through a U.N.S.C. veto. This means of
delay will no longer be possible in a Concert of Democracies.
Finally, even setting aside the question of substantive
agreement with the decisions of the Concert of Democracies, it
is entirely possible that non-member countries will in fact view
the decisions of the Concert of Democracies as more legitimate
than those of the U.N.S.C. As noted above, it is the U.N.S.C.,
not the General Assembly, which currently makes all the
important decisions on matters of war and peace. Though many
countries will not have representation in the U.N.S.C. or the
Concert of Democracies, the Concert of Democracies will at
least ensure that each region will at all times have equal
representation in the smaller organ, and no country will have
disproportionate power through a veto right. It is likely, then,
that countries will prefer the decisions of the Concert of
Democracies, given the organization’s vastly more defensible
structure and procedures.
2. Superior Outcomes
From the perspective of the United States, a Concert of
Democracies will result in superior outcomes. Democracies
generally have similar perspectives on modern threats to
international peace and security, most notably the spread of
weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes and terrorism—
67

See, e.g., Ivo Daalder & Robert Kagan, The Next Intervention,
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2007, at A17 (“There is a difference between force
used to enlarge one’s territory and force aimed at alleviating a grievous harm
done to others. A just cause, a clear strategy for success and a definitive
threat to ourselves or to others whom we are obliged to protect all lend
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in no small part because terrorists and rogue regimes target
democracies more often than non-democracies. Indeed, in the
past ten years alone, transnational terrorism has struck in the
United States, Europe, and India, as well as in America’s new
democratic allies, Iraq and Afghanistan. A Concert of
Democracies would, therefore, be more inclined than the
U.N.S.C. to take forceful action in response to these threats.
This point is not merely theoretical. Since September 11,
democracies have proven far more supportive than their nondemocratic counterparts of punitive measures against, among
others, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea. 68 To
be sure, democracies are not always in full agreement about the
magnitude of the threat and the best method of resolution.
Nonetheless, there is far greater agreement among democracies
than there is between the democracies and the nondemocracies. 69
A Concert of Democracies would also result in superior
outcomes for the international community. Notwithstanding the
fact that it is in the entire international community’s interests to
eliminate terrorism and prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction to rogue regimes, a Concert of Democracies would
also accomplish more on issues such as genocide and other
gross human rights violations. Democracies have a more
deeply-rooted commitment to upholding human rights and
assuring that other countries do the same. Indeed, every major
humanitarian intervention in the past fifty years—including
those in El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo—has been spearheaded by democracies. 70
If, as expected, a Concert of Democracies succeeds in
addressing challenges to international peace and security, it will
enhance the organization’s standing among members and nonmembers alike. Democracies will appreciate that the
organization allows them to more efficiently tackle modern
threats, and will, as a result, become more loyal to the Concert
of Democracies over time. Many non-democracies, in turn, will
68
69
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see the Concert of Democracies’ interventions in humanitarian
crises and will come to recognize the value that the organization
provides. The superior outcomes achieved through a Concert of
Democracies, then, will ultimately reinforce the organization’s
legitimacy.
3. Superior Incentives
One of the drawbacks of the present international
security architecture is that it provides states with perverse
incentives to accumulate power. As noted in Part II, at the
founding of the United Nations, the states that wielded the most
power were rewarded with a permanent seat on the U.N.S.C.
They were also given a veto, and with it a disproportionate
capacity to shape the course of world events. The pattern
continues today, as countries that have become more powerful
in recent decades—including India, Brazil and Japan—are now
under consideration for permanent seats if the U.N.S.C. expands
its membership. 71 The lesson countries learn from this is that if
they want to be taken seriously and shown respect from their
peers in the international community, they would do well to
become more powerful in military and economic terms. 72 This
is hardly the effect an international organization—particularly
one dedicated to maintaining international peace and security—
should have on state behavior.
A Concert of Democracies would provide far healthier
incentives. 73 Rather than reward the accumulation of power, it
would reward states for steps they take towards establishing
democratic governance. States that become solidly democratic
would be granted membership and an equal voice in the
organization. The Concert of Democracies could thereby
71
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become a powerful catalyst for the worldwide expansion of
democracy, much like the European Union catalyzed the
expansion of democracy on its continent. Such an expansion of
democracy would enhance respect for civil and political rights
worldwide, and would also be in harmony with the stated U.S.
national security objectives.
4. Collective Authorization
Finally, the Concert of Democracies preserves the most
appealing feature of the present system—the concept of
collective authorization. As noted in Part II, some of the reform
proposals would do away with that concept and, for example,
expand the definition of self-defense to allow countries to use
force in a larger number of situations without having to consult
other members of the international community. However, the
idea of a body charged with considering the merits of the use of
force is a sensible one. The use of force by any country
imposes substantial externalities on the international
community. The international community should, therefore,
have a voice in the decision-making process leading up to the
use of force. The affirmation of the international community
through collective authorization, in turn, can be extremely
helpful to the United States, by providing diplomatic cover and
other valuable benefits.
IV.

MAKING THE CONCERT OF DEMOCRACIES A REALITY

The idea for a Concert of Democracies is ambitious, and
some countries may at first feel reluctant to join. They may
think it unnecessary, for example, to commit to a new
international institution. Alternatively, they may fear that a
Concert of Democracies undermines the current international
security architecture and violates international law. It will be
important, therefore, to develop incentives that help overcome
wait-and-see instincts and to craft arguments that place a
Concert of Democracies within the bounds of international law.
A. Incentives
The most obvious incentive for joining the Concert of
Democracies would be an economic benefit. Many of the
countries eligible for membership in the Concert of
Democracies are among the world’s poorer countries. 74 These
countries would value economic assistance for development as
74

See supra note 58 for the list of countries.

25

well as to strengthen institutions and the rule of law. These
countries would be more likely to join the Concert of
Democracies if membership were linked to those forms of
economic assistance. Furthermore, by strengthening democratic
governance among recipient countries, these benefits would also
help to advance one of the chief goals of the Concert of
Democracies.
The Concert of Democracies could also attract members
by emphasizing that the organization offers the opportunity to
wield greater influence on the world stage. Today, important
democracies like Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan are not able
to provide meaningful input when the U.N.S.C. makes decisions
on matters of war and peace. But these countries are obviously
interested in participating in the decision-making process, and
have signaled their interest by lobbying for permanent seats in
the U.N.S.C. 75 The Concert of Democracies would offer a
faster, more realistic way for these countries to gain the
influence they seek.
Finally, a Concert of Democracies might consider
exploring whether to provide trade benefits or security
guarantees to members. This is a strategy that has proven
effective for the European Union and NATO. The European
Union, for example, allows for the generally free movement of
goods, services, and capital among all member states.76
NATO’s charter, meanwhile, contains provisions relating to
economic cooperation, but far more important, says that an
armed attack against one will be considered an armed attack
against all. 77 Some combination of these policies might be
appropriate in the context of a Concert of Democracies.
B. Arguments under International Law
1. U.N. Charter
The first option, and the one that is perhaps least
disruptive, would be to justify the Concert of Democracies
through the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Charter, after all, explicitly
endorses human rights, equality, and other democratic values.
Advocates of the Concert of Democracies could argue that these
provisions in the U.N. Charter are entirely compatible with the
75
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creation of a Concert of Democracies, since the Concert of
Democracies would help advance the cause of human rights,
equality, and democratic governance. Indeed, by this logic, the
Concert of Democracies would not only be compatible with the
U.N. Charter, but it would actually complement and strengthen
it.
It is unclear, however, whether this justification alone
would be sufficient to afford the Concert of Democracies the
powers it will need under international law in order to function
effectively. If the Concert of Democracies truly operates within
the existing legal framework of the United Nations—much like
NATO—then, at least in theory, the Concert of Democracies
would still require a U.N.S.C. resolution in order to take any
punitive measures. This, of course, would to a large extent
defeat the purpose of establishing a Concert of Democracies.
2. Right of Revolution
A more dramatic option would be to replace the U.N.
Charter altogether, and the right of revolution may supply a
rationale for doing so. The right of revolution is the widely
recognized principle that a government can be replaced if it no
longer serves the ends for which it was instituted. 78 Perhaps the
most elegant expression of that principle appears in the United
States Declaration of Independence, which states that
“whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive” of
certain ends, it is “the Right of the People to alter or to abolish
it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” 79
Expressions of this right can also be found in several state
constitutions in the United States. The constitution of New
Hampshire, for example, states that “whenever the ends of
government are perverted . . . the people may, and of right out to
reform the old, or establish a new government.” 80 Similarly, the
constitution of Kentucky states that “for the advancement of
these ends, [the people] have at all times an inalienable and
indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in
such manner as they deem proper.” 81
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Advocates of the Concert of Democracies might argue
that the principle applies equally in the international context.
The U.N. Charter was instituted for certain purposes, including
to effectively manage threats to international peace and security
and to protect human rights, among other things. The
U.N.S.C.’s manifest inability to take action in response to the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of terrorism,
and humanitarian crises, then, arguably constitutes a failure of
the U.N. Charter to achieve the purposes for which it was
enacted. The international community may have an argument,
therefore, that it is entitled to replace the U.N. Charter the same
way that national constitutions have been replaced over the
years when they have proven ineffectual.82
3. Customary International Law
The notion that the U.N.S.C. does not, or should not,
possess a monopoly on the authority to authorize punitive
measures may have already worked its way into international
law through state practice. Since 1946, many states have used
force without explicit authorization from the U.N.S.C. and
without an explicit self-defense rationale. 83 The United States,
for example, instituted a blockade against the Soviet Union
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and claimed it was empowered
to do so because of an authorization from the Organization of
American States (OAS). 84 More recently, NATO took action
against Serbia in defense of Kosovo without explicit
authorization from the U.N.S.C. 85 In spite of the absence of
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U.N.S.C. authorization in that case, however, NATO’s punitive
measures against Serbia were widely perceived as legitimate.
The Kosovo intervention, then, demonstrated that Americans
and Europeans “did not believe international legitimacy resided
exclusively at the UN Security Council, or in the U.N. Charter,
or even in the traditional principles of international law . . . .” 86
Rather, acting in Kosovo without Security Council approval
“left the determination of international justice in the hands of a
relatively small number of powerful Western [democracies].” 87
These examples could provide a legal justification under
customary international law for authorizing the use of force
through a Concert of Democracies. They demonstrate that
countries can and do make decisions regarding the use of force
outside of the U.N.S.C. framework. Moreover, they suggest
that countries already accept the idea that organizations other
than the U.N.S.C.—the OAS in one case, NATO in the other—
can confer legitimacy upon punitive measures. A Concert of
Democracies would encompass a larger number of countries
than both the OAS and NATO and it would command a more
coherent set of arguments for why it should be empowered to
authorize the use of force. It could therefore be argued that a
Concert of Democracies, empowered to authorize the use of
force, is within the bounds of what has already been established
under customary international law.
4. Right to Democratic Governance
Finally, international law scholars have begun to
recognize the concept of a right to democratic governance. 88
According to these scholars, the right finds its origins in concept
of self-determination. That concept became a central feature of
the post-World War II order and was enshrined in the U.N.
Charter. It was also enshrined in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which states: “All peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.” 89 As one scholar has noted,
the concept was thereby “universalized and internationalized,”
having become “a duty owed by all governments to their
86
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peoples and by each government to all members of the
international community.” 90 Taken together, the provisions in
the U.N. Charter and the Covenant entitle citizens of all nations
to “determine their collective political status through democratic
means.” 91
Complementary provisions concerning the right to a
democratic electoral process further bolster these provisions
relating to self-determination. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirms the right of all persons to participate in
“periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent
free voting procedures.” 92 The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states that every citizen has the right “to vote and be
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.” 93
Several regional organizations have explicitly recognized this
right as well. The OAS Charter requires members to promote
“the effective exercise of representative democracy.” 94
Meanwhile, the European Convention on Human Rights
obligates signatories to “undertake to hold free elections at
reasonable intervals by secret ballot.” 95
Taken together, these concepts and provisions could
form a strong legal foundation for the Concert of Democracies.
International law has come to recognize the right to democratic
governance and the supreme legitimacy of the democratic
political system. Existing international institutions, however, do
not reflect this development and continue to provide an equal
forum for governments that do not uphold their obligations
under the various charters and declarations affirming that right.
A Concert of Democracies, by contrast, would only provide a
role in the organization to those states that respect the right to
democratic governance, thereby affirming the right as explicitly
as possible. A Concert of Democracies, then, would constitute
the institutional culmination of the right to democratic
governance.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The existing collective security apparatus is broken. The
U.N.S.C. regularly fails to respond effectively to humanitarian
crises, the threat of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. Reform proposals are in some cases
appealing, but in general they would either fail to address the
underlying deficiencies of the current system, or are not
workable, given the ability of the permanent members of the
U.N.S.C. to veto reforms they do not support.
The United States, together with other democratic
countries, must spearhead the creation of a Concert of
Democracies. Shared values would allow the members of a
Concert of Democracies to cooperate more meaningfully in
addressing modern threats. A Concert of Democracies could
also serve as a catalyst for democratic reform, helping to
strengthen institutions in nascent democracies and to spur
political transformation in non-democracies. Over time, the
Concert of Democracies would gain the respect of members and
non-members alike, and would become the bedrock of
international security architecture for the 21st century.
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